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Non-Technical Summary 
 
Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes can be a powerful policy tool to spur welfare-enhancing 
investments and licensing in oligopolies. Consider environmental regulation settings, where 
any firms` investments in the development of non-polluting technologies are costly and where 
one firm can become a licensee of the non-polluting technology if another firm has developed 
it. Firms may behave strategically by investing little or refusing to apply for a license to save 
costs while hoping to force the regulator to adopt looser regulations, which is denoted as hold-
up problem. Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes treat firms alike, whether they invest enough/ 
become a licensee or not. 
We analyze hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D as well 
as hold-up problems with respect to the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. 
We investigate two different self-financing tax-subsidy mechanisms (announcing the tax rate 
versus announcing the subsidy rate) and analyze whether they can overcome existent hold-up 
problems. In addition, we compare the social welfare implications of these two alternative 
tax-subsidy mechanisms and of the standard emission taxation. 
The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable to solve hold-up problems with 
respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In contrast, only the announcement of the 
subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up problems with respect to the licensing of 
environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether, the announcement of the subsidy rate 
yields higher expected social welfare than the announcement of the tax rate or the standard 
emission taxation if the marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level. 
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Abstract
We explore the design of self-financing tax-subsidy schemes to solve hold-up problems
in environmental regulation. The announcement of the tax rate seems to be preferable
to solve hold-up problems with respect to the investment in environmental R&D. In
contrast, only the announcement of the subsidy rate is adequate to solve hold-up prob-
lems with respect to the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. Altogether,
the announcement of the subsidy rate yields higher expected social welfare than the
announcement of the tax rate or the standard emission taxation if the marginal damage
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1 Introduction
Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes can be a powerful policy tool to spur welfare-enhancing
investments and licensing in oligopolies. Consider environmental regulation settings, where
any firms‘ investments in the development of non-polluting technologies are costly and where
one firm can become a licensee of the non-polluting technology if another firm has developed
it. Firms may behave strategically by investing little or refusing to apply for a licence to save
costs while hoping to force the regulator to adopt looser regulations, which is denoted as hold-
up problem. Self-financing tax-subsidy schemes treat firms alike, whether they invest enough
/ become a licensee or not. If one firm produces with a non-polluting technology and the
other causes emissions, the polluting firm must pay taxes, which are used in turn to subsidize
the environmentally friendly firm. The regulator can credibly trigger investments in the
development of environmentally friendly technologies and licensing of the environmentally
friendly technology.
Hold-up problems are real-world phenomena. For instance, the standards specified by
the 1970 American Clean Air Act were repeatedly delayed. Most dramatically, faced with
industry claims that the proposed emission standards would shut down factories, Congress
amended the Act in 1977, thus both weakening and postponing the standards. Similarly, in
1988 the government delayed standards for the 1989 model year. Further evidence of the
hold-up problem can be found in Weimann (1995), where the ”cartel of silence” on the part
of engineers is illustrated as preventing the government from imposing tighter regulations.
Another recent example illustrates credibility problems. In 1998, Congress included a
provision in the highway bill that delayed the first steps towards bringing states into compli-
ance with the Clean Air Act’s long-standing goal of ”reasonable progress” toward eliminating
man-made haze in specially protected areas for six to nine years. Until Congress intervened,
the Environmental Protection Agency had planned to ask states to file preliminary plans by
1999, showing how they would eventually raise visibility standards gradually over the next
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few decades by complying with the new rules that had been proposed two years earlier.1
We analyze hold-up problems in the context of environmental R&D investments as well
as the licensing of environmentally friendly technologies and evaluate whether self-financing
mechanisms can overcome existent hold-up problems. In addition, we compare the social
welfare implications of two alternative tax-subsidy mechanisms and of the standard emission
taxation.
Our scheme might be applied as a ”feebate”-system in the automotive sector to promote
the sale of environmentally friendly cars. Feebates generally refer to fees on fuel-inefficient
vehicles and rebates on fuel-efficient ones. A first option of a feebate-system is taxation of
the purchase of cars which exceed a certain emission level, and to refund the tax revenues
to the buyers of cleaner cars. A second option is the implementation of a feebate-system at
the industry level, which would be equivalent to our tax-subsidy scheme. The production of
environmentally friendly cars could be subsidized by using the revenues from the taxation
of the production of environmentally harmful cars.
2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper relates to different strands of the literature. Gersbach (2002) has suggested self-
financing tax-subsidy mechanisms as a solution for hold-up problems by announcing subsidies
when firms compete a` la Cournot. Breitscheidel and Gersbach (2003) have analyzed whether
the regulator should set taxes or subsidies when using tax-subsidy mechanisms.
More basically, our paper draws from the literature on the original hold-up problem,
where a firm facing a single buyer may find investment unprofitable if, after making the in-
vestment, the buyer offers to pay only marginal costs. This problem has been discussed
1See New York Times, May 27, 1998.
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in Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Joskow (1987), Williamson (1983), and in the
incomplete-contract literature (see the survey by Hart (1995)).
The idea that governmental threats or promises may not be credible has already been
discussed in literature on trade protection (Staiger and Tabellini (1987), Matsuyama (1990),
Tornell (1991)), regulation of utilities (Salant and Woroch (1992)), Gilbert and Newbery
(1994), Urbiztondo (1994)), and privatization (Levy and Spiller (1997)). It is therefore
generally being assessed that the hold-up problem is only solvable if there are means which
make governmental regulation credible. Therefore in our paper, we analyze the investment
and licensing incentives of two alternative self-financing tax-subsidy schemes as compared
to the incentives of standard emission taxation.
Furthermore, our analysis involves the concepts of mechanism design that uses the tools
of multi-stage games and subgame perfect equilibria (see Varian (1994) or Moore (1992) for
a review of the literature). Addressed from this perspective, tax-subsidy mechanisms are
examples of subgame perfect implementation of environmental regulation.
Our paper refers to work about the incentives to adopt clean technologies in the design
of environmental policy instruments. Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung, Krutilla and
Boyd (1996) examine firms’ incentives to invest in new technology, and provide a ranking of
different policy instruments (see also Laffont and Tirole (1996), Requate (1995) and Requate
and Unold (2003)). In our context, we examine incentives to invest in clean technologies
when a firm can influence the tightness of regulation by its investment decision.
Since we are considering R&D-processes, there is a connection to the literature about
the incentives of environmental regulation to innovate in clean technologies (Innes and Bial
(2002), Porter and van der Linde (1995). Strategic firm behavior plays also an important
role in this context (Yao (1988), Malik (1991), Biglaiser, Horrowitz and Quiggin (1995)).
Finally, our paper is related to the licensing literature (Gallini (1984), Katz and Shapiro
(1989)).
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3 Model
We consider an industry with two firms denoted by i = 1, 2 producing a homogenous good.
The firms compete a´ la Cournot and the marginal cost of production is zero and is indepen-
dent of the installation of abatement technology.
Q = q1 + q2 (1)
is the industry’s output, where qi denotes the output of firm i. Social welfare depends on
consumer surplus S(Q), on producer surplus net of investment costs P (Q), on investment
outlays of each Firm Ii (Ii ∈ R+0 ) and on the social costs of emissions D(E), whereby E
denotes the amount of emissions. D(E) is the social damage in terms of willingness to pay
and is set to fulfill the following conditions:
∂D(E)
∂E
> 0,
∂2D(E)
∂E2
≥ 0, D(0) = 0. (2)
Therefore, social welfare, denoted by W , is given by
W = S(Q) + P (Q)− I1 − I2 −D(E). (3)
The inverse demand function is linear and the product price p ≥ 0 is
p = 1− bQ, (4)
with b > 0.
Without investing in R&D, no emission abatement technology is available to the firms.
But the firms can invest in the development of a perfect abatement technology, whereby
this technology has the same properties as the conventional technology except for the fact
that it operates free of emissions. The demand is independent of the technology as well.
Ulph and Ulph (1996) denote this R&D process as environmental R&D. A firm develops the
environmentally friendly technology with the probability Θ(Ii), whereat both firms research
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independently of each other and it is possible that both firms develop the new technology.2
Θ is a continuous function and has the following properties
Θ(0) = 0, lim
Ii→∞
Θ(Ii) < 1,
∂Θ(Ii)
∂Ii
> 0, lim
Ii→0
∂Θ(Ii)
∂Ii
=∞, ∂
2Θ(Ii)
∂I2i
< 0 (5)
If only one firm (say firm i) has developed the new technology, it can offer that technology
to the other firm at an arbitrary price of licensing Vi. If the other firm accepts this offer,
both firms can use the development without additional costs. The chronology of regulation
and firm decisions is as follows:
Stage 1: Announcement of regulatory framework and subsidy/tax rates
Stage 2: R&D: Investment and realization of R&D achievement
Stage 3:

Fixing of Vi and purchase decision if only firm i has developed
of firm j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j) the new technology
no activities else
Stage 4: Implementation of regulation (subsidy/tax rates)
Stage 5: Production and competition
We only consider symmetric equilibria with respect to the investment decision at the
second stage (since both firms are identical) and write I = I1 = I2.
4 Emission Taxation, Tax-Subsidy Schemes, and Hold-
up Problems
4.1 Emission Taxation
As a starting point of regulation, we consider the standard emission taxation, denoted by
tax-REG, whereat the tax revenues are passed on to the consumers via a lump-sum-transfer.
2See Katsoulacos und Xepapadeas (1996).
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Under tax-REG, the regulator maximizes W , taking the investment and licence decisions of
the firms as given.
4.2 Hold-up Problems
Two different kinds of hold-up problems can occur. The first one is the one with respect to
the firmsb4 investment levels. We define:
Definition 1 The hold-up problem with respect to investment (HUPI) exists, if and only
if firms invest ceteris paribus less than would be welfare maximizing.
The second hold-up problem is the one with respect to the licensing decisions. It is
desired from a welfare point of view that the firm, which did not derive an environmentally
friendly technology from the R&D measures, purchases the non-polluting technology from
the other firm, if only the other firm did develop the environmentally friendly technology in
the R&D process. Additionally, it is simple to show that the unsuccessful firm will purchase
the new technology if and only if tK ≤ 2
5
, where tK denotes the tax rate per unit of product
sold for the polluting firm under tax-REG if the other firm produces without emissions. This
yields the second definition:
Definition 2 The hold-up problem with respect to licensing (HUPL) exists if and only if
tK > 2
5
.
4.3 Tax-Subsidy Scheme
As an alternative to tax-REG we consider a self-financing tax-subsidy scheme. Our self-
financing constraint ensures that no funds from the government budget are needed. The
government commits to use the following self-financing tax-subsidy scheme:
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(i) Both firms pollute Emissions tax t0
(ii) One firm pollutes Subsidy to the non-polluting firm, financed
by the taxation of the polluting firm
(tax-subsidy-rule)
(iii) No firm pollutes No taxes or subsidies
If both firms pollute, the regulator passes on the gains from taxation as a lump-sum
transfer to the consumers. If only one firm pollutes, the tax-subsidy-rule is used and we
have: The non-polluting firm is subsidized by s, which denotes the subsidy per unit of
product sold, and the polluting firm is taxed by t, which denotes the emission tax per unit
of product sold. The regulator has two choices. He can announce a subsidy rate denoted by
sann or he can announce a tax rate denoted by tann; either rate is determined by the self-
financing condition. To describe subsidization and taxation, suppose that (without loss of
generality) firm 1 does not pollute and firm 2 does. Then, the regulation of the two possible
scenarios looks as described in the following two subsections.
4.4 Announcement of the Subsidy Rate
The regulator announces the subsidy rate sann: The polluting firm 2 has to pay the tax rate
t =
 min{sannq1,max{Π∗2, 0}}/q2 if q2 > 00 else (6)
and the non-polluting firm 1 is subsidized by the rate
s =
 min{sann,max{Π∗2/q1, 0}} if q1 > 00 else , (7)
whereby Π∗2 denotes the second firm’s pretax net profit (the net profit without consideration
of tax payment tq2). By these rules the regulator always ensures that the self-financing
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condition (the gains from taxation equal the subsidy outlays) is fulfilled in any case, that
is for any combination of q1, q2 and s
ann. Therefore there are no incentives for firm 2 to
attempt to violate the self-financing condition. If the implementation of sann would violate
the self-financing condition given the production quantities q1 and q2, rules (??) and (??)
would lead to a downward adjustment of s and t until the self-financing condition is fulfilled.
The regulator maximizes social welfare by announcing the subsidy rate sann = s∗ = 3
√
5−5
10
,
which means that s∗ is an element of the subgame perfect equilibrium of our five-stage game.3
We define
Definition 3 The use of the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the subsidy rate
s∗ is denoted by s-REG.
4.5 Announcement of the Tax Rate
The regulator announces the tax rate tann: Net profits Π1 and Π2 are realized. The regulator
taxes the polluting firm 2 by the tax rate
t =
 min{tann,max{Π∗2/q2, 0}} if q2 > 00 else (8)
and subsidizes the non-polluting firm 1 by the subsidy rate
s =
 min{tq2,max{Π∗2, 0}}/q1 if q1 > 00 else , (9)
whereby Π∗2 again denotes the second firm’s pretax net profit. As before, rules (??) and (??)
provide for the fulfillment of the self-financing condition.
3A proof is available upon request.
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The regulator maximizes social welfare by announcing the tax rate tann = t∗ = 1
2
if the
following condition holds:4
min
t∈[0,t∗]
∂D(E)
∂E(t)
>
1
4x
, (10)
whereby x denotes emissions per unit of polluting output, denoted by QE. As an example,
consider section ??, where a linear damage function D(QE) = eQE is assumed. There, the
condition (??) is fulfilled if e > 1
4
. To let our analysis not become to complex, we assume
that the regulator can commit to implement the rate t∗. If (??) holds, this assumption
does not influence the results. In other cases it would be possible, that the regulator could
increase W by implementing another tax rate if just one firm uses the environmentally
friendly technology. But in all cases the commitment to t∗ yields the highest investment
incentives, wherefore this regulation measure is interesting as a benchmark. We define:
Definition 4 The use of the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the tax rate t∗
is denoted by t-REG.
5 Tax-Subsidy Scheme versus Standard Emission Tax-
ation
In this section we compare tax-REG, s-REG and t-REG. Do s-REG or t-REG in certain
situations yield a higher social welfare W than the traditional emission taxation (tax-REG),
and if yes, under which conditions?
It is desired from a social welfare point of view, that HUPL and HUPI become ceteris
paribus mitigated. But solving one of the two hold-up problems does not automatically
yield an increase in the expected social welfare, Exp[W ], since different regulatory measures
typically affect several variables, namely the investment decision I, the licence decision and
4A proof is available upon request.
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the production quantities qi.
5 It could happen, for example, that one regulatory measure
causes less emissions due to higher I, but stronger product market distortions than another
measure.
5.1 Solving Hold-up Problems
We now turn our attention to both hold-up problems and analyze the investment as well as
the licensing decisions. The firm’s investment decision under a certain regulation (REG) is
denoted with I∗REG. In most cases, it is possible to rank I
∗
REG under the different regulations
if HUPI exists. The results are summarized in the following proposition:6
Proposition 1 If HUPI exists, we have
I∗tax−REG < I
∗
s−REG if t
K ≤ 2
5
(11)
and
I∗s−REG ≤ I∗t−REG. (12)
The existence of HUPI means, that the firms invest less than the social welfare maximiz-
ing amount under tax-REG. From proposition ?? follows, that t-REG always solves HUPI .
s-REG solves HUPI if tK ≤ 2
5
, which implies a relatively small marginal damage of emis-
sions. Increasing I by using another regulation than tax-REG when HUPI exists is denoted
by ”solving HUPI”. If tK ≤ 2
5
holds, both s-REG and t-REG solve HUPI . t-REG brings
about a higher investment level I than s-REG.
Next, we consider the effects of the different regulations on the licensing decision. Assume
temporarily, that only one firm has had success in developing the environmentally friendly
5The definition of solving HUPL or HUPI is given in the following subsection.
6A proof is available upon request.
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technology. In the equilibrium, the other firm will become a licensee of the technology if
the regulator uses s-REG. If the regulator uses t-REG in that situation, no licensing will
take place. Under tax-REG, a licensing will take place if and only if tK > 2
5
, which implies
HUPL. This brings us to our second proposition:7
Proposition 2 s-REG solves HUPL and t-REG does not.
We denote the licensing due to the use of a regulatory measure in a situation where only
one firm has had success in developing the non-polluting technology and where HUPL exists
by ”solving HUPL”.
5.2 Welfare Comparison
In this subsection we analyze the implications of the different regulatory measures with
respect to the expected social welfare Exp[W ], denoted by Exp[WREG]. Comparing s-REG
and tax-REG yields the following proposition:8
Proposition 3 Given tK ≤ 2
5
and I∗s−REG ≤ Iopttax−REG holds. Then we have
Exp[W s−REG] > Exp[W tax−REG]. (13)
Here, Iopttax−REG denotes the welfare optimal investment level under tax-REG. The con-
clusion of proposition ?? could be phrased as follows: Assume the current regulation is
tax-REG, HUPL does not exist, and I∗s−REG is smaller than I
opt
tax−REG. Then the regulator
can increase the expected social welfare Exp[W ] by using s-REG instead of tax-REG.
The comparison of t-REG and tax-REG results in the following proposition:9
7A proof is available upon request.
8A proof is available upon request.
9A proof is available upon request.
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Proposition 4 Given tK = 1
2
holds. Then we have
Exp[W t−REG] = Exp[W tax−REG]. (14)
From proposition ?? follows, that the expected social welfare Exp[W ] is the same under
t-REG and tax-REG if the marginal emission damage is that high, that the regulator picks
a tax rate tK as high as possible, which means tK = 1
2
. The intuition is as follows: The
regulation of t-REG and tax-REG differ only if exactly one firm uses the non-polluting
technology. The tax rate tK = 1
2
yields the same equilibrium under t-REG and tax-REG
since the non-polluting firm becomes a monopolist in both cases. Because we seek the
welfare best of the three regulatory measures, but can not entirely compare the measures in
the current framework, we specify S and Θ in the following section to come to additional
insights.
6 Analysis with Specification of S and θ
In this section we specify the damage function S and the function of the discovery probability
Θ so as to compare tax-REG, s-REG, and t-REG on the basis of these parameters. We
determine, which of the three regulatory mechanisms yields a higher expected social welfare
Exp[E] under which circumstances. In doing so, we discuss whether the result is dependent
on the parameter that characterizes the damage function S.
6.1 Model
Since our analysis using the damage function D did not yield a complete ranking order of
our three measures with respect to maximizing expected social welfare Exp[W ], we specify
S to get information about the situation with HUPIAdditionally, we replace the condition
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for the existence HUPI , namely tK > 2
5
with a condition dependent on D. We assume
the following emission damage function D, which has a constant marginal damage of the
emission generating production quantity QE:
D(QE) = eQE, (15)
with e > 0.
Now, the inverse demand function p = 1 − bQ and the damage function D = eQE are
parameterized and can be characterized by b and e, respectively. We can deduce the following
corollary since e > 7
30
holds if and only if tK > 2
5
holds:
Corollary 1 We have
HUPL ⇐⇒ e > 7
30
. (16)
For the sake of simplicity we assume the following function of the discovery probability:
A Firm i ( i = 1, 2) develops the emission abatement technology with the probability
Θ(Ii) =

√
Ii if Ii ≤ (1− ε)2
1− ε if Ii > (1− ε)2
, (17)
if it invests Ii in R&D. ( 0 < ε << 1)
Assuming this functional form of Θ necessitates that no firm invests more than (1− ε)2
in R&D. Since no profit maximizing firm will invest more than the monopoly profit in R&D,
which is 1
4b
, the following assumption ensures investments smaller than (1− ε)2 if ε is chosen
sufficiently small:
b >
1
4
. (18)
6.2 Analysis
In this subsection, we figure out, which of the three alternative mechanisms maximizes the
expected social welfare Exp[W ]. We start with the comparison of s-REG and t-REG.
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6.2.1 Comparison of s-REG and t-REG
The comparison of Exp[W s−REG] and Exp[W t−REG] for different ranges of e yields the
following result. We have
Exp[W s−REG] > Exp[W t−REG] (19)
for all e (> 0) and all b (≥ 1
4
).10 It turns out that s-REG is preferable compared to t-REG,
since s-REG yields a higher Exp[W ] in the equilibrium. No we compare the preferable
alternative, s-REG, with the standard emission taxation tax-REG, to investigate the best of
the three considered alternatives. We do not have to consider t-REG any more, since it is
dominated by s-REG.
6.2.2 Comparison of s-REG and tax-REG
Similar to the preceding subsection, we compare Exp[W s−REG] and Exp[W tax−REG] for
different ranges of e and come to the following conclusion. We have
Exp[W s−REG] > Exp[W tax−REG] (20)
if e > 3b
36b−1 .
11 This means that s-REG dominates both t-REG and tax-REG with respect
to maximizing the expected social welfare Exp[W ], if e > 3b
36b−1 holds. The regulator should
use s-REG if the emission damage D has a relatively strong influence on the social welfare
W (e > 3b
36b−1). s-REG leads to a lower Exp[W ] if e is smaller than
3b
36b−1 , which is intuitive.
If the marginal damage from emissions is relatively small (e < 3b
36b−1), then the damage of
emissions D becomes rather meaningless and it is not worth to invest in R&D. In such a
situation, tax-REG is preferable over s-REG, since firms invest less under tax-REG.
We consider two examples with a non-linear marginal damage of emissions. In both
examples, s-REG yields the highest expected social welfare.
10A proof is available upon request.
11A proof is available upon request.
14
Example 1 b = 1, D = (QE)
2. We have
Exp[W s−REG] ≈ 0, 198677 > Exp[W tax−REG] ≈ 0, 197824 > Exp[W t−REG] ≈ 0, 186827.
(21)
Example 2 b = 1, D = 3(QE)
2. We have
Exp[W s−REG] ≈ 0, 123119 > Exp[W tax−REG] ≈ 0, 111699 > Exp[W t−REG] ≈ 0, 111682.
(22)
6.3 Results
In this section we have assumed a constant marginal damage of emissions and have in
particular assumed a damage function of the form D = eQE. Furthermore, we have assumed
that a firm develops the environmentally friendly technology with the probability Θ =
√
Ii
(i = 1, 2). In this situation, Exp[W s−REG] > Exp[W t−REG] holds for the whole range of
the damage parameter e. Additionally, Exp[W s−REG] > Exp[W tax−REG] holds if e > 3b
36b−1 .
Therefore s-REG dominates the other two regulatory measures, if the marginal damage of
emissions exceeds a certain level, which is the more interesting case.
7 Conclusions
In the present paper we considered hold-up problems in the context of environmental R&D
investments and licensing of environmentally friendly technologies. We analyzed whether
hold-up problems in a Cournot-duopoly can be solved by using self-financing tax-subsidy
schemes and whether one can increase social welfare by using these schemes instead of a
standard emission taxation. The hold-up problems were defined under an emission taxation
regime.
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Two different types of hold-up-problems can occur. The first hold-up problem is the
problem with respect to the investment decision and the second problem is the one with
respect to the licence decision. In our analysis, we have compared the standard emission
taxation and two different tax-subsidy schemes, namely one with the announcement of the
subsidy rate and one with the announcement of the tax rate. If exactly one firm has developed
an environmentally friendly technology, then the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement
of the tax rate does not yield the licensing of the technology, whereas the tax-subsidy scheme
with the announcement of the subsidy rate always yields the licensing. That is why only the
announcement of the subsidy rate solves the hold-up problem with respect to licensing. But
the tax-subsidy scheme with the announcement of the tax rate yields the highest investment
expenditures in R&D of environmentally friendly technologies, wherefore the announcement
of the tax rate is best in solving hold-up problems with respect to the investment decision.
In a specified model with a constant marginal damage of emissions, we have compared
the expected social welfare under the three regulatory measures. It turns out that the tax-
subsidy scheme with the announcement of the subsidy rate dominates both, the tax-subsidy
scheme with the announcement or the tax rate and the standard emission taxation, if the
marginal damage of emissions exceeds a certain level. Two examples with a non-linear
marginal damage of emissions yielded the same result.
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